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Abstract 
The entry of new competitors operates as a balancing force against high levels of industrial 
concentration and the abuse of dominant position by firms with large market shares. Entry increases 
supply, lowers prices, intensifies innovation and brings equilibrium to the markets that don’t 
operate in a socially desirable manner. This paper examines the impact of regulatory restrictions to 
the entry of new competitors in industrial sectors. It provides a short description of the 13 most 
important sources of regulatory barriers and assesses their role and importance as entry barriers. 
The conclusion is that regulatory restrictions can be a very important, almost insurmountable barrier 
to the entry of new competitors, but their role is not always socially harmful. The use of certain 
sources of regulatory barriers is effective in protecting social welfare instead of harming it. Barriers 
that promote new competition or are applied in order to protect consumer welfare are socially 
useful, while barriers that restrict competition and limit new competitor entry, in cases other than 
natural monopolies, are socially harmful. 
 
Introduction 
This paper’s goal is to examine the impact of regulatory restrictions to the entry of new competitors 
in industrial sectors. Firstly barriers to entry and then regulatory barriers to entry are defined. 
Following is a description of the most important sources of regulatory barriers and next there is an 
analysis of the various arguments for and against their application in relation to social efficiency. 
Next is a brief outline of empirical studies on the topic. Policy recommendations regarding each 
source of regulatory barriers are made in the final part of the study. 
 
Definition of a barrier to entry 
The entry of new competitors relates with the appearance of a new producer in a market (OECD, 
2005) and can take many forms such as foreign direct investment, trade licenses, joint ventures, 
strategic alliances, acquisitions, direct export or greenfield investments in new industrial facilities. 
The entry of new competitors operates as a balancing force against high levels of industrial 
 2
concentration and the abuse of dominant position by firms with large market shares. Entry increases 
supply, lowers prices, intensifies innovation and brings equilibrium to the markets that don’t 
operate in a socially desirable manner. The ease of entry is adjusted according to the number and 
height of barriers to entry. Various definitions of barriers to entry have been proposed in the 
economic literature, as the ones from Bain (1956), Stigler (1968), Caves & Porter (1977), 
VonWeizsacker (1980), Demsetz (1982), Baumol & Willig (1981), Gilbert (1989) and McAfee et al 
(2004). The definition adopted in the present study is a mixture of the definitions proposed by 
Fisher (1979) and OECD (2005). A barrier to entry is defined as anything that restricts competition 
in a sector, when competition would be socially beneficial. This definition can include a large 
number of possible barriers to entry, covers intra- and extra-sector mobility situations and clearly 
points out the aim of the analysis, which is social welfare enhancement.  
In regard to the categorization of barriers to entry, the most practical separation that has been 
proposed in the literature is the one from Geroski et al (1990), followed also by Oustapasidis (2003) 
and OECD (2005). They distinguish between structural and strategic barriers to entry. Structural 
barriers arise from the exogenous demand, cost and technology conditions of an industry and are the 
same for all firms, new or incumbent, while strategic barriers are created from the actions and 
strategic choices of incumbent firms. Even though this separation is far from perfect, as many 
barriers fall in both categories, however it is a good starting point for a thorough analysis of the 
barrier to entry theory. Examples of structural barriers are economies of scale, sunk costs, capital 
costs, product differentiation and diversification, while examples of strategic barriers are limit 
pricing, predatory pricing, investments in capacity, patent hoarding and collusion. The present study 
will focus on regulatory barriers to entry. 
Regulatory barriers belong to the category of structural barriers to entry, but they could as well be 
treated as strategic barriers. They belong to structural barriers because they constitute a part of the 
fixed, exogenously determined conditions that a new firm will have to face during it’s entry in an 
industry. However, they also belong to strategic barriers because their height is sometimes 
strategically affected by firms’ actions. Incumbent firms can raise the power and influence to affect 
government policies and regulations in their favor. 
 
Definition of regulatory barriers 
Regulatory barriers are considered by many authors (such as Geroski, 1991; Parker & Stead, 1991; 
Church & Ware, 2000; European Commission, 2004; OECD, 2005; Bitzenis, 2009) as very 
important barriers to the entry of new competitors, mainly due to the fact that they are created from 
government action and they have the support of the law for their application. Regulatory barriers 
include laws and regulations as well as the state industrial policy. These two are mentioned together 
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because they both derive from a country’s government. The difference between legal restrictions 
and economic policies that are applied by a government lies mainly on their time duration: laws 
usually have long time duration, while economic policies can be adjusted relatively quickly 
according to the general economic environment.  
A distinction that has to be made is according to the effects that regulatory barriers have to various 
types of entrants. The number and height of entry barriers that a foreign firm will face while trying 
to enter in a national industrial sector, may be more compared to those that will be faced by a new 
domestic firm that wishes to carry out entry in the same sector. This is why regulatory barriers are 
one of the factors that affect the choice of foreign firm entry mode. The sources of legal barriers to 
entry are many and these will be mentioned in the following part. 
 
Sources of regulatory barriers to entry 
The most important sources of regulatory barriers to entry are the following: 
i. Natural monopolies, monopoly rights and licenses  
In many cases governments grant monopoly rights in certain firms though legislation. These firms 
acquire exclusive rights in the supply of products or services for a limited or unlimited period of 
time. This situation is met more frequently in industries known as natural monopolies. A natural 
monopoly exists when the attainment of the minimum efficient scale of production is achieved only 
if the entire production of an industry is concentrated in the hands of a single firm. In these sectors 
the minimum efficient scale is equal or almost equal to the size of the entire market and the long run 
average cost curve decreases significantly as production quantity increases. The presence of other 
competitors in sectors that constitute natural monopolies is not considered useful, on the contrary it 
is considered as a waste of economic resources.  
In other cases governments intervene legally in sectors through the issuing of licenses. This occurs 
when the number of those that provide a good or service is regulated externally by the government. 
The entry of new competitors is allowed only with the purchase of an existing license or through an 
increase in the number of licenses by the government (eg taxis).   
ii. Tariffs  
Legal restrictions in imports can be observed from tariffs. A tariff is the most usual protective 
barrier imposed by a state in the import of products of foreign origin. It consists in the collection, by 
the border authorities responsible for the custom clearance, of a percentage on the value of the 
imported quantity of products (Gklavinis, 2009). The height of the tariff differs from product to 
product depending on the degree of protection that the government wants to offer in the domestic 
industry (Krugman & Obstfeld, 1994). The tariff raises the costs of imported products and 
automatically renders them less competitive from the domestic ones, since it increases their final 
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prices to the consumers. The main objectives of tariffs are the increase of state revenues and the 
protection of domestic industries and products against foreign competitors.   
iii. Quotas   
Quotas are limitations imposed by a state in the imported quantities of a product.  The most usual 
way of imposing quotas is the obligation of the importer to receive a special permit by the 
government. This permit allows the import of specific quantities of a product during its valid period 
and restricts the import of further quantities during that period. Quotas, however, can also be 
imposed in the exports of a domestic product by blocking a producer to expand in foreign markets 
where he could possibly earn higher profits. Moreover, in many cases quotas are used by 
governments as a means of pressure, with embargos being the most characteristic example of trade 
restrictions of this kind. Embargos in trade are forced between countries with political, financial, 
territorial or security disputes (Gklavinis, 2009). 
iv. Subsidies  
The term subsidy refers to the state financial allowance of public organizations or private firms in 
order to support their operation and competitiveness. Subsidies can take many forms, such as the 
payment of sums in the form of donations, loans or shares, the elimination of debts, the granting of 
credit in the payment of taxes and the granting of energy, water, or telecommunication services in 
prices lower than normal market prices. A separation has to be made between two subsidies 
schemes, the general and the specific subsidies schemes (Carlsson, 1983). In general subsidy 
schemes all the companies of a sector, new or incumbent, can be subsidized, while in the specific 
ones only particular companies or persons are subsidized.   
v. Taxes 
A state’s taxation can also affect the entry of new competitors. The height of taxes like income tax, 
property tax, profit tax and value added tax increase the operating cost of a firm and can play an 
important role in the final entry decision of a possible newcomer. Taxation can also determine the 
structure of a sector, since the differences in tax rates can affect concentration levels. A low tax rate 
in high profits, for example, can lead in merger waves among small firms. Very important is also 
the issue of double taxation. Double taxation occurs when a firm has to pay taxes both in its country 
of origin as well as in the foreign markets that it operates. Double taxation raises firms’ costs and 
can have a negative impact on the viability and profitability of companies that enter new 
geographical sectors. Also important is the issue of special consumption taxes, which again can 
negatively affect competition in a sector.  
vi. Loans 
Governments can also intervene in the structure of an industrial sector through the loans that they 
administer to firms. The term loan refers to the lending of monetary sums on interest. Government 
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intervention can play a role in the process of a loan’s approval, in the size of the loan, as well as in 
the height of the paying off interest and time duration. In other cases the role of governments is 
limited in providing the guarantees for the approval of the loan.  
vii. Government procurement  
Many authors (such as Geroski et al, 1990; Scherer & Ross, 1990; Geroski, 1991; Kovacic, 1992; 
Duggan & Scott-Morton, 2006) claim that government procurement can also play a role in the 
determination of market structure and consequently in the ability of new firms entry. The contracts 
that accrue from government procurement agreements – taking under consideration the fact that the 
government is usually the largest domestic consumer – can provide incumbent firms the financial 
resources they need in order to achieve economies of scale in production and survive for a long 
period of time. These companies can win large market shares in the industries that they operate. 
Important is also the fact that foreign companies are in many cases excluded from these contracts 
for national security (etc defence industries) or state revenue reasons. 
viii. Intellectual property rights  
Another form of legal barriers to entry are intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights 
are administered by governments in the creators of new ideas in order to protect them from 
imitation and competition (Church & Ware, 2000). The three most important types of protection for 
intellectual property are patents, copyrights and trademarks. The three types of protection differ in 
their content and valid time period. 
A patent provides an inventor with exclusive rights for a new product, process, substance or design. 
New products include machines (mechanisms with moving parts) or manufactured objects (without 
moving parts) such as tools. New processes or methods include chemical processes for metals or for 
the manufacturing of drugs, mechanical processes for the manufacture of goods or electric 
processes. New substances include chemical compounds and mixtures, but can also include species 
of animals and plants. New designs include the shapes of products that serve a functional purpose. 
Moreover, improvements in products, processes, and substances can also be granted with a patent, 
as well as computer software inventions (Carlton & Perloff, 2000). With the issuing of patent rights 
the law grants a legal monopoly in the company that has received the patent, as it protects the 
company from copying and competition in production for a constant period of years. The years of 
patent validity differ from country to country, although patents are not accepted in all the countries 
around the globe. 
Copyrights give their creators the exclusive production, publication and sale rights to artistic, 
dramatic, literary or musical works. Examples are articles, books, drawings, maps, musical 
compositions, distinctly designed items and photographs. Copyright law also covers the original 
"work of the author's profession" provided that they are “fixed" in a "tangible medium" such as a 
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book (Carlton & Perloff, 2000). While patents protect the function and the purpose (ideas, 
appliances, mechanisms, methods, and means), copyrights cover artistic expression. An important 
distinction between patents and copyrights is that copyrights protect the particular expression of an 
idea, while the patents protect any tangible incorporation of that idea. 
Trademarks are words, symbols or other marks that are used in order to distinguish a company’s 
product or service from those that are provided by other firms. A commercial trademark is a mark 
as a word or a logo that represents a product. A service trademark is a mark for a service. A 
common law trademark is a mark that is not registered formally, but has acquired minimal rights 
through use. The state registration of a trademark or service trademark provides better protection 
than the common law, but is only useful in the state of issuance. A trade name is the name that a 
company uses in order to do business. Contrary to copyrights and patents, brand names do not 
expire after a predetermined period, although a company can lose the protection of its brand name, 
if its name ends up stating all the products in the industry (Carlton & Perloff, 2000).    
ix. Sanitary and phytosanitary protection measures and measures for the environment  
The term sanitary and phytosanitary protection measures refers to every measure that is imposed by 
the law of a state in relation to the attributes of a product but also concerning the conditions of its 
production, storage, transport, maintenance and consumption. The aim of these measures is the 
protection of the life and health of the population, of animal and plant production and more 
generally the flora and fauna, from the spreading of illnesses or pollution (Gklavinis, 2009). The 
application of these measures must be based on scientific principles and their usefulness must be 
proved by scientific data. In most cases countries comply in their requirements with international 
specifications and recommendations, it is however likely for certain countries to issue stricter 
measures, provided that such measures are justified scientifically or constitute a consequence of the 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection that the state considers suitable. These measures also 
include measures for the protection of air and water from industrial facilities, as well as measures 
for employee safety. 
x. Technical Barriers   
Technical barriers refer to barriers that result from the adoption and application of “technical 
regulations”, that determine the technical characteristics of a product or the processes of its 
production (Jacobson & Andreosso - O' Callaghan, 1996; EC, 2009). A technical regulation can 
also concern the nomenclature, the symbols, the labeling or the packaging of product. Technical 
barriers can also result from the use of technical specifications (standards) that are published by 
recognized certification organizations, and contain rules, guidelines, directives and characteristics 
of common and repeated use for products or processes of production that are not obligatory for the 
producers or the tradesmen of such products (Gklavinis, 2009). Thus the difference between 
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technical regulations and technical specifications lies in the fact that the first are binding, while the 
second are not. Regulations for the recognition of education titles are also included in technical 
barriers.  
xi. Registration, certification, licensing and social security  procedures 
Another aspect of legal barriers to entry is the one that relates with registration, certification, 
licensing and social security procedures faced by new firms. The number, the duration and the cost 
of these procedures can affect the ease and the cost of new firm entry and also affect market 
structure (Lipczynski & Wilson, 2001; Bitzenis, 2002; Djankov et al, 2002: Bitzenis, 2009). These 
procedures are another way of state intervention in the economy through legislation. Research 
carried out by Djankov et al (2002) pointed out that the costs of these procedures are high in many 
countries and that their number and duration differ considerably in each case, with the most 
numerous procedures being met in developing countries.   
xii. Price Fixing 
Another source of legal barriers to entry arises in cases where governments intervene by fixing 
prices. In these cases the state, in order to protect consumers’ best interest, determines the minimum 
or maximum prices of products or services (Carlton & Perloff, 2000).   
xiii. Dumping 
The policy of dumping that is followed occasionally by some governments can also influence 
market structure. The term dumping refers to the deliberate export of  a product in a foreign market 
in a price lower than the one that is in effect in the domestic market (Ktenidis, 1996). Governments 
use dumping in order to support domestic producers and capture market share in foreign markets. 
 
Are regulatory barriers socially desirable or not? 
The evaluation if, and to what extent, the laws and policies that were mentioned in the previous 
section, constitute barriers to the entry of new competitors and whether these are useful or not from 
a social point of view, will be carried out in the following part. The evaluation will be made by 
outlining the arguments that have been put forward for and against legal barriers to entry. Before 
the analysis of the arguments begins, however, it would be useful to note that the evaluation of the 
impact of legal barriers to entry could escape the limits of present study and be placed in the more 
general discussion about the role of government intervention in the economy. The degree of 
intervention in the economy by the government can characterize a political system as liberal or 
socialist (at least from an economic point of view). These two political systems emanate from two 
different opinions for the function of the economy. The one supports that political power must 
ensure social effectiveness in favor of citizens and hence contains a large degree of intervention in 
the economy (if not total control), and the other supports that social effectiveness and growth can 
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emanate only via free market operation and competition. In reality it is exceptionally infrequent, 
almost impossible, to find an economy in the world without absolutely no intervention at all. 
However, because examining the effects of intervention is not one of the objectives of the present 
study, the analysis will focus on the specific arguments for and against regulatory barriers to entry. 
The term arguments for regulatory barriers, in this case, does not mean the apposition of arguments 
that try to convince that legal barriers do not constitute barriers of entry, but arguments that try to 
convince that legal barriers are barriers to entry, but exist because they are socially beneficial.   
 
Arguments in favor of regulatory barriers to entry 
One of the main arguments for the existence of regulatory barriers to entry springs from the need 
for protection of natural monopolies. Legal protection in cases of natural monopolies is necessary 
because an increase in competition in these industries would lead in a reduction in the monopolistic 
firm’s market share and this in turn would undermine its ability to exploit all available economies of 
scale (Waterson, 1987; Waldman & Jensen, 2000). This means that the restriction in the number of 
producers comes from the need to minimize production costs (Church & Ware, 2000). If production 
is characterized by economies of scale and average cost decreases as production increases, then it is 
always less costly the production to be carried out by a single firm than by many firms. This is the 
reason why Domberger & Piggot (1986) claimed that public property is essential in cases of natural 
monopolies. Through monopoly in these cases, society avoids unnecessary investments in capacity 
reproduction and the waste of economic resources that these investments involve (OECD, 2004). 
The protection of natural monopolies from governments can also protect the positive externalities 
that these create for other related companies and for consumers in general.   
Another argument in favor of the protection of natural monopolies through regulatory barriers 
emanate from the view that the government in these cases functions as a guarantor of the quality 
and quantity of the products and services produced. This argument is based on the principle that the 
mechanisms of political direction and responsibility are most suitable to control a market than 
private individuals. If a natural monopoly belongs to the state, the effectiveness of the state 
monopolistic company is associated with the general effectiveness of the government. A failure to 
meet society’s objectives would have an impact on the following elections, rendering the 
government responsible for the failure.  
Government intervention can protect consumers’ interest, even if a natural monopoly is transferred 
in private ownership though the issuance of monopoly rights. Through the terms of the contract 
(especially in regard to prices and quality) as well as through the regulation of the terms of supply, 
governments can again function as effective market regulators. If a government doesn’t take any 
precautionary measures while opening up these industries, the result may be socially harmful. An 
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industry can be monopolized by a private firm who may abuse its market power and raise prices in 
very high levels. But even if these markets do not lead in private monopolies but in a large number 
of competitors, then a situation named excessive competition may appear. Excessive competition is 
a situation characterized by excessive capacity, increased production costs, reduction of total 
demand, reduction of investments and exit of many firms from the industry (OECD, 2004).   
The legal protection of natural monopolies can also guarantee the service of markets that would not 
be efficient for the private sector to serve (e.g. consumers in frontier areas) and also ensures that 
these monopolistic companies will gather the financial resources they need in order to achieve 
technological change and innovation through R&D (Waldman & Jensen, 2000). The availability of 
economic resources earned by monopolies is considered by many authors as a prerequisite for 
technological change (e.g. Schumpeter, 1943). A large number of small companies would not 
permit the gathering of the resources required for conducting R&D and creating innovative products 
and services.   
Some other arguments in favor of the application of regulatory barriers to entry arise from the need 
to protect the domestic economy and state revenues. Legal barriers as tariffs and monopoly rights 
can offer precious income for the state (Krugman & Obstfeld, 1994; Church & Ware, 2000). These 
can be used for the support of the national economy and for the improvement of the citizens’ quality 
of life in general. In many cases these revenues are transferred in other industrial sectors. Moreover, 
legal barriers as duties, quotas, taxes, subsidies, loans, procurement policies and price fixing can be 
used for the support of domestic production. The restriction of competition in an industry can help 
domestic producers to increase their sales and gain the capital they need in order to survive in the 
long-term. The capital raised can be used for the achievement of economies of scale as well as for 
investments in R&D. These policies are mainly used for “infant” industries, meaning those that are 
still in their initial stage of development and need the support of the state in order to survive 
(Carlton & Perfloff, 1999). This support is essential especially in cases where the other competitors 
of the industry are large diversified multinational firms.   
Apart from the improvement of the competitiveness of domestic firms, important is also the 
argument that connects legal protection with the increase in domestic employment. More advanced 
arguments are those that support government intervention for the avoidance of dependence in 
foreign economies and their economic precessions, as well as those that relate with the national 
security issues (e.g. defensive industries). Moreover, legal barriers may also arise due to the 
influence of pressure groups such as trade unions and consumers associations, which some times 
“besiege” political power in order to protect their own interests (Thilmany  & Barrett, 1997). 
Another line of arguments in favor of legal barriers emanates from the usefulness of the measures 
for protection of health, safety and intellectual property. All governments impose regulations for 
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health, safety and protection of the environment though the specifications in domestic and imported 
goods and services, but also though certification, licensing and inspection procedures. These 
regulations aim to protect the health and the quality of life of the residents of a country, to protect 
the natural environment in which they live and to provide safety measures for employees (Jacobson 
& Andreosso - O' Callaghan, 1996). Regulations for safety can also solve problems of incomplete 
information in relation to the quality of products. The marking of products along with strict safety 
regulations can increase total active demand because of the alleviation of consumer’s concerns 
about quality. This is the main difference between technical barriers and other traditional trade 
restrictions such as tariffs and quotas: technical barriers can strengthen demand.  
On the other hand legal barriers that concern intellectual property are also considered justified. The 
protection of intellectual property is required in order to ensure the motives for new creative efforts 
and innovations. Innovations play a vital role in economic and technological growth. Some claim 
that these could not be achieved if the law does not guarantee to innovative firms the monopolistic 
rights and profits they need in order to redeem the investments that they have made in R&D 
(Lipczynski & Wilson, 2001). This means that patents lead to the availability of products that would 
be impossible or not practical to be created without legal protection. These new products and 
services have multiple benefits for the economy. Apart from the improvement of production 
techniques and the cost efficiency that they can create for producers and consumers, they can also 
improve the competitiveness of the economy (e.g. via exports). Ginarte & Park (1997) found a 
strong correlation between the income of country and the strictness of laws that protect intellectual 
property. Another argument that has been put forward in favor of the protection of intellectual 
property rights is the one that concerns trademarks. If a firm’s trademarks are not protected legally 
from copying, then this firm would not have a motive to be differentiated in regard to quality and 
price by other firms in the market. Advertising would be pointless as it would be very difficult for 
consumers to separate advertised products during their purchases.  
 
Arguments against regulatory barriers to entry 
Although all the arguments mentioned above certainly stress the usefulness and the positive 
consequences of regulatory barriers to entry, however there are many arguments claiming exactly 
the opposite. Regulatory barriers can have negative effects in economic efficiency as they constitute 
the most important and difficult to overcome barriers to the entry of new competitors. Neo-Austrian 
economists Parker & Stead (1991) supported the view that all other barriers should be ignored 
because they are not important. From an Austrian perspective, the divergences of cost between 
firms, new or incumbent, are inevitable, as inevitable are also the efforts of new businessmen to 
overcome these barriers though innovation and advertising. For their new-Austrians, the only true 
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barriers are those that result from government activity, as these are the only barriers that cannot be 
overcome from new firms. The advocates of the so called Chicago school of economic thought 
agree with this opinion.   
The reasons for the rising of these barriers have been connected by many authors with the influence 
of economic circles in politicians (Posner, 1971; Stigler, 1971; Sykes, 1995; Thilmany  & Barrett, 
1997; Church & Ware, 2000; Lipczynski & Wilson, 2001; OECD, 2005; Bitzenis, 2009). This 
theory was developed in modern economics by Stigler (1971). Stigler’s basic principle is that the 
government possesses a monopoly in the exercise of legal power and this monopoly firms seek to 
influence for their own interest. Politicians are willing to provide legal protection in return for help 
in the achievement and maintenance of political power. In return for the utilization of laws and 
regulations that limit competition and deter entry, firms provide politicians and political parties 
what that need in order to win the elections: money and votes. Consequently politicians are 
controlled by the firms which they are supposed to control. In return to votes, economic resources 
or the promise of future employment, regulators use their power in order to serve private firms’ and 
their own personal interests (Stead et al, 1996). Posner (1971) extended further this opinion by 
supporting that state intervention in markets is influenced not only by firms, but also by various 
other pressure groups, such as consumer associations and trade unions. Based on this principle later 
on Peltzman (1976), claimed that market intervention through legal restrictions in reality creates 
imperfections instead of solving them. As companies are more organized than consumers that 
regulators represent, they have the power to influence political circles more effectively. This can 
lead in the long run to a situation named regulatory capture, meaning the formation of current 
legislation to the best interest of the private firms and to not of society as a whole. 
Economists often refer to these firms’ pressure efforts as rent seeking, which means the expense of 
resources for the achievement of government created monopolistic profits (Church & Ware, 2000; 
OECD, 2005). Another relative argument is the one that stresses that the cost of controlling a 
market is high (because of the committees that have not be organized in order to decide the form of 
intervention), as high are also the time delays in the entry of new companies that these procedures 
can create.    
The restriction of competition in industrial sectors constitutes in substance the most powerful 
argument against legal restrictions and industrial policy. Either in cases of government-protected 
monopolies or in cases of exercise of industrial and trade policies that intervene, control and delay 
entry, the results are similar: exclusion or restriction of entry, reduction in the number of 
competitors, high concentration, lack of consumer choice and finally transfer of resources from 
consumers to producers. Taking for example tariffs, quotas and subsidies: these barriers reduce the 
competitiveness of imported products and limit the social gains they could create. An increase in the 
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number of products and services through imports, can increase consumers’ available choices and 
offer a price competition that will decrease final market prices. Many domestic producers could also 
benefit though the import of more efficient raw materials and production factors. 
In regard to dumping, its use has obvious negative effects in the operation of competition in 
industrial sectors, as the import price of new products does not represent their real cost, but is 
rendered low due to government intervention with a sole aim to take over a sufficient share of the 
targeted market. This practice can lead other, more efficient, domestic producers on the fringe of a 
sector. The agreements of the World Trade Organization on the application of compensatory 
measures for dumping (GATT article 6 “Anti-dumping and countervailing duties” 1994), and the 
legislation of the European Union  (EE L 56, 6.3.1996. p.1) on the defense from imports of this kind 
have been put forward for protection against dumping.   
On the other hand procurement policies followed by some governments can also negatively 
influence competition and growth (Kovacic, 1992; EU, 2009). As a country’s government usually 
constitutes the largest domestic consumer, the choice of suppliers that it makes can play a very 
important role in the development of market structure. Opaque and discriminatory procurement 
policies sometimes result to the support of specific companies and to the degrading of all the rest in 
the sector, up to the closure of some them. Companies that gain government contracts are in place 
to secure the resources they need in order to develop faster than their competitors and capture large 
market shares.  
But also taxes imposed by governments have some negative consequences in firm competition. 
Beyond the obvious consequences of double taxation and the high tax rates in production and 
income, other negative consequences are those related with increasing concentration in markets 
where small companies are forced to merge with larger ones in order to pass in more favorable 
scales of taxation and depreciation (Carlton & Perloff, 2000). 
Another line of arguments against legal barriers to entry are those that relate with the application of 
technical barriers to entry. According to the European Commission for Trade (2009) “the gradual 
reduction of tariff barriers to trade has been accompanied by an increase in the number of 
measures creating technical barriers to entry, such as regulations on packaging, labeling or 
conformity assessment procedures. These regulations can be intended to pursue a legitimate 
objective, such as the protection of human health or safety. However, they are also sometimes 
wrongfully used in order to erect protectionist barriers around a domestic market” (online). This is 
why the EC has signed with the WTO the Technical Barriers Treaty (TBT), which tries to ensure 
that regulations, standards, test and certification procedures do not create unnecessary barriers to the 
entry of new competitors. 
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As noted by Thilmany & Barrett (1997), trade liberalization agreements as NAFTA that decreased 
traditional protection methods as tariffs and quotas, can provide a motive for the development of 
more complex, less transparent means for the protection of domestic industries. The reason is that 
this trade protection can be less vulnerable in critics from outside parties, especially if the trade 
restrictions are connected with sensitive political matters, as health and safety (Kramer, 1984; 
Chambers & Pick, 1994). These barriers, however, in contrast to tariff barriers, are difficult, if not 
impossible to measure. Often they are hidden in the switching costs for compliance with specific 
standards or regulations and to time consuming expenses for testing and certification procedures 
(Thilmany & Barrett, 1997). 
According to the European Commission technical barriers: “not only add extra costs, but also 
distort production patterns, increase unit costs, increase stockholding costs, discourage business 
cooperation and fundamentally frustrate the creation of a common market for industrial products. 
Until all these barriers are removed, community producers are forced to focus in national rather in 
continental markets and are unable to benefit from the economies of scale that a truly unified 
market offers" (CEC, 1985, p. 17). The elimination of technical barriers can improve market access, 
rear the protection of large incumbent firms and lead to a higher degree of competition. 
Finally, another negative aspect of technical barriers to entry has been highlighted by Scherer & 
Ross (1990) and concerns the effects in small businesses that cannot correspond with the cost of 
conformity with technical regulations. The cost of the necessary equipment required for the control 
of water supplies, air and worker safety in industrial facilities that has been imposed by 
environmental laws and laws for work safety, has led many small business in closure. 
The last line of arguments against legal barriers to entry comes from the concerns about the 
effectiveness of the intellectual property rights system and especially for patents. As patents issue 
monopoly rights to their holders for a large number of years, they are in turn able to charge high 
prices and earn monopoly profits. Apart from the well known consequences that every monopoly 
has in relation to the loss of consumer surplus, further negative effects come from the inability of 
other firms and organizations to exploit new technology and produce new products and services in a 
more rapid rate. This is why in some cases the duration of patents is judged as excessively high 
from a social point of view. This critic is also based on the opinion that knowledge is a public good 
and no one should be excluded from its use (non-exclusivity). This argument is more clear 
especially in cases where innovative products and services can have an instant impact in people’s 
lives (e.g. medicines). 
The issuance of a long term patent can, however, have more extensive consequences for an 
industrial sector. The monopoly profits and market power that are earned by the firm that holds an 
important patent may allow it to monopolize the sector and drive all other firms out of competition. 
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This harms social welfare, as the monopoly power of the firm escapes the monopoly of a product 
and extends in the whole industry. This process is partially owed in a negative parameter of the 
patent system that relates with who wins the patent first. Many companies are involved in the 
process that has been named patent races, and means the excessive focus in R&D with an aim to 
win a patent. As patent offices can grant a patent in only one firm, the first one that presents all the 
necessary certificates, this means that all other firms that have invested in R&D of the same 
technology will get nothing. This phenomenon has been named in modern economics as “winner 
takes all” (Lipczynksi & Wilson, 2001) and implies the waste of resources in R&D activities of the 
same kind.  
Problems with the process of patent issuance can also be created from the different systems adopted 
by various countries (Church & Ware, 2000). Another issue also relates with the differentiation 
criteria of innovation. The stricter the differentiation criteria from previous innovations are, the 
harder it is to win a patent, and this in turn extends the period for which a current patent can win 
monopoly profits. Other negative parameters of patents relate with the recent burst in patent 
applications for plants and living organisms. This process has created serious criticisms from the 
supporters of the view that natural chemical compounds and organisms belong to manhood and they 
should not be legally secured and commercially exploited. 
Although the above tell us that in substance governments must balance, through legislation, 
between providing motives to private companies for investing in R&D and the diffusion of 
knowledge as a public good, there have been completely different proposals for the promotion of 
R&D and technology. Alternative plans for the promotion of innovations are those that relate with 
government awards for those companies or organizations that produce innovative products and 
services. These opinions are strengthened from research that has proven that R&D does not relate 
with the issuance of patents, but it is something that would also happen without them (Taylor & 
Silberston, 1973; Schankerman, 1998; Lipczynksi & Wilson, 2001). 
 
Empirical studies on regulatory barriers to entry 
Due to the large number of regulatory barriers and the different form they take in each case, the 
empirical studies on the topic are many. In this part of the study there is going to be a short 
reference to empirical studies for each source of regulatory barriers. The issue of natural 
monopolies and monopoly rights was examined by Joskow & Rose (1989) and Mosca (2008). The 
OECD has also published many investigations into sectors which are considered natural monopolies 
(e.g. 2000, 2001). Another study is that of Gelfond & Spiller (1987) in relation to the banking 
industry. The relationship between government intervention and private sector was examined in the 
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study of Spiller (1990), while Pittman (1988) examined the relation of rent seeking with industrial 
structure. Jacobsen & Soysa (2006) examined the relationship between rent seeking and FDI.  
An interesting research related to tariffs is that of Geroski & Murfin (1991) for the UK car market. 
An overview of the effects of tariffs, quotas and other trade policies was made by Corden (1971) 
and a study of the effects of tariff barriers to entry is that of Rousslang & Suomela (1985). Tarr 
(1989) on behalf of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, has published an assessment of the impact 
of tariffs on three major sectors: textiles, automobiles and steel. Hoekman et al (2004) examined the 
relation between tariffs and country size. 
Regarding subsidies, an important empirical study is that of Carlsson (1983) on the role of 
industrial subsidies in Sweden, while very interesting is also the one of Dixit & Kyle (1985). 
Typical is the study by Majumdar (1988) for the aircraft industry. The legal side of subsidies was 
examined by Stewart & Dwyer (1998) and Hernandez de Madrid (2007). The role of taxation in 
industrial structure was examined in the studies by Prais (1981), Spiller & Favaro (1984) and 
Bitzenis (2009), while for loans characteristic is the study by Gonzalez-Maestre & Granero (2003). 
In relation to procurement policies important are the studies made by Duggan & Morton (2006) on 
the role of government procurement in drug prices in the U.S. and Burnett & Scherer (1989) for the 
U.S. defence industry. 
Taylor & Silberston (1973) and Schankerman (1998) examined the relation of patents with 
innovation. The relation among IPR protection and economic growth was examined by Horri & 
Iwaisako (2006). IPR in relation to drug access was examined by Heywood (2002). In relation to 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures and environmental protection measures, a complete analysis is 
that of Gruenspecht & Lave (1989), while a specific industry study (food) is that of Thilmany & 
Barrett (1997). Policy considerations regarding the application of such measures were examined by 
Miljkovic (2005). Technical barriers were examined by Cecchini (1988) and Hanson & Saykiewicz 
(2007), but important are also the legal studies by Marceau & Trachtman (2002) and Henson & 
Wilson (2005). Technical barriers in the EU were examined by Brenton et al (2001). 
The number, the cost and the duration of registration, certification, licensing and insurance 
procedures were researched by Djankov et al (2002), while a very good analysis of the operation 
and impact of price fixing is made by Carlton & Perloff (2000). Legal barriers to the Balkan 
markets and in particular the case of Bulgaria were examined by Bitzenis (2002), Bitzenis and 
Marangos (2008) and Bitzenis (2009).  Finally in relation to dumping typical are the studies of by 
Czako, Human & Miranda (2003) and Kong (2003). 
 
Policy recommendations 
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By examining the arguments for and against the various sources of regulatory barriers to entry, it is 
possible to make some policy recommendations about their application and impact. Natural 
monopolies should be legally protected by the governments, as more competition in these industries 
is not socially beneficial. More competition in these cases would increase production costs through 
unnecessary investments in capacity reproduction. Strict state legal and financial control of these 
industries is a necessary prerequisite for safeguarding their social effectiveness. Where monopoly 
rights are issued, the terms of the contracts must again ensure the socially desirable level of prices 
and quality of products and services provided. The use of licences can limit competition, so the 
opening of these industries can create socially desirable effects.  
Tariffs and quotas can limit competition so their application is not useful from a social standpoint. 
Subsidies, taxes and loans should only be used only in order to promote more competition. These 
regulatory tools should be used only in order to promote new firm start ups in concentrated markets, 
and not as a strategic tool for restricting current and future domestic or foreign competition. 
Government procurement on the other hand, should be made with transparent selection procedures 
so as not to distort industrial competition. The contracts signed should not be very long in duration, 
so that the fear of replacement will prohibit private firms from degrading the products or services 
they provide to the state. Industry specific adjustments are needed in each case. 
In regard to IPRs, there has to be a distinction among them. While copyrights and trademarks are 
useful from a social point of view, the role and the duration of patents needs to be reconsidered. 
Trademarks are necessary for the effective operation of competition in the economy, as they 
provide the basic motive for differentiation regarding the price and quality of the products and 
services. Copyrights are also useful in order to promote new ideas. The patent system needs to be 
reconsidered by governments and international organizations. The long duration of patents, the 
monopoly rights they provide, their exclusivity, the restriction of competition and the different 
patent systems around the globe are the main reasons for a complete rethinking of the patent 
system. A free patent system, some claim, would lead in less innovation, as less financial resources 
will be invested in R&D. Others claim that on the contrary, a system without patents would lead in 
more innovation, as firms would need to introduce new products and services more often in order to 
survive. A step towards that direction would be to decrease the patents’ time duration and discover 
new means for rewarding innovation. 
The application of sanitary, phytosanitary and environmental protection measures, as well as 
technical barriers, should all be used in order to protect social health and welfare and not as 
anticompetitive tools that restrict competition. In order to achieve that, the use of these measures 
and standards must be based on core scientific data published by international organizations. 
Registration, certification, licensing and social security procedures should be minimized to a 
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minimum in order to promote and simplify new firm entry. Once new firms are established, then 
governments can apply the desirable level of firm inspection. This has a double effect: on the one 
hand new competition is encouraged and on the other hand the government can more easily control 
established firms. 
Price fixing is a policy that must be used with caution. A very high price may create a black market 
for products and services, while a very low price can undermine the ability of the firms to survive. 
Price fixing can be effective only in monopolistic or highly concentrated oligopolistic industries. 
However before setting a price, the government must first calculate the profit margins in all stages 
of production. Finally dumping is a policy that needs to be examined carefully, as price competition 
is desirable from s social point of view. As with predatory pricing, this strategic tool cannot be 
applied without the backing of some structural advantages. The effects of dumping on competition 
however cannot ne long-term. The country applying dumping is in risk of making more losses in the 
long run than gains.  
The basic criterion for the application and of each regulatory barrier is the effect it has on social 
welfare. If social welfare, in cases other than natural monopolies, is connected with more 
competition, than it is easy to separate those regulatory barriers that restrict domestic or foreign 
competition from those that are applied in order to increase the number of firms. Specific attention 
has to be given in providing motives for new firm entry and the intensification of competition 
though technological progress and innovation. New innovative products and services can lower 
production costs, make better use of the available economic resources and help new firms to surpass 
structural and strategic advantages of incumbent firms more effectively. 
 
Conclusions 
Regulatory barriers constitute the most difficult to surpass barriers to entry as they spring from 
government action and have the power of the law for their application. Through the various sources 
of regulatory barriers governments can intervene in the process of industrial competition and affect 
market structure and social efficiency. Regulatory barriers can also completely block, delay or 
undermine in terms of cost the entry of new competitors in industrial sectors. The presence of 
regulatory barriers and the restriction of competition that they create is socially effective only if it 
takes place in order to protect competition and social welfare. In cases where politicians erect these 
barriers in order to serve private companies’ or their own personal interests, these barriers have 
socially undesirable effects. In order to correctly assess the importance and usefulness of each 
regulatory barrier to entry it is always necessary firstly to assess the motives behind its application 
and its long term effects in competition. 
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